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Dysfunctional information system behaviors are not all created the 
same: Challenges to the generalizability of security-based research 
 
Highlights: 
 We use a four-quadrant insider dysfunctional information system behavior taxonomy. 
 We analyze intentions underlying behaviors among different dysfunctional behaviors. 
 The intentions vary among dysfunctional information system behaviors. 
 The causal links between behavioral intentions and their predictors vary. 
 We address methodological concerns in the insider dysfunctional behaviors literature. 
 
Highlights (for review)
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Dysfunctional information system behaviors are not all created the 
same: Challenges to the generalizability of security-based research 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Conflicting findings in the existing studies on insider dysfunctional information system (IS) 
behaviors have led some researchers to raise methodological concerns that samples in these 
studies are aggregated or disaggregated without sufficient attempt to differentiate their 
fundamental differences. Using a four-quadrant behavior taxonomy, this study investigates 
different types of dysfunctional information system behaviors to determine if, among them, 
there are any differences in behavioral intentions and in the causal links between these 
intentions and their predictor variables. The results show that both the intentions and the 
causal links between these intentions and their predictors vary among the four behavior 
categories. 
 
Keywords: 
Dysfunctional behavior taxonomy 
Theory of planned behavior 
Behavioral intention 
Structural equation modelling 
Partial least square 
Vignettes  
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1. Introduction 
Information system (IS) security risks posed by inappropriate actions of individual 
members of an organization have been a topic of interest in a vast amount of literature [1-3]. 
These individuals are insiders who sit behind the organizational firewall and are empowered 
with escalated user privileges [4]. They have a dual role in information security systems, both 
as allies and as a source of threats [5]. Studies have suggested that within the information 
security chain, insiders remain the weakest link in the effort to secure organizational IS assets 
[2, 3, 6, 7]. Some surveys and investigations have also shown that despite rapid advancement 
in protection technologies as well as IS security policies and procedures, IS security breaches 
remain significant and they are substantially linked to actions of insiders [8, 9]. 
The call for more studies on the behavioral aspects of IS security has long been 
voiced [4], and some significant studies exist in this area. The existing studies in the IS 
security area that look into the behavioral aspects of the insiders have provided insights into 
the effects of insiders‟ dysfunctional behaviors on organizational IS assets. These can be seen 
in valuable work on IS security compliance/non-compliance behaviors [10-20] including  
motivations to comply with IS security policies [21-24], IS misuse [2, 25-31], and studies on 
computer abuse [32-34]. These IS security studies, however, have largely focused on non-
malicious and policy non-compliance behaviors [4, 7]. This leads to a further need for more 
studies into a broader range of actions that pose various levels of risk to organizational IS 
assets. 
The following are some examples of the above studies. Myyry, Siponen, Pahnila, 
Vartiainen, and Vance [15] aimed to explain employees‟ IS non-compliance in terms of 
moral reasoning and values. Hu, Xu, Dinev, and Ling  [16] described and tested a model of 
information security policy violation based on multiple criminological perspectives. Ifinedo 
[21] integrated social bonding, social influence, and cognitive processing perspectives to 
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understand employees‟ IS security policy compliance behaviors. Son [23] tried to explain 
why employees do or do not follow IS security rules using an intrinsic motivation model. 
Lowry, Posey, Bennett and Roberts [32] used fairness theory and reactance theory to explain 
why employees may blame organizations for and retaliate against improved IS policies.  
In general, these studies can be aggregated as studies of IS security deviant behaviors 
within the context of volitional malicious and non-malicious behaviors [7, 11, 35]. This 
aggregated behavior typology, despite its usefulness, does not differentiate similar yet 
fundamentally disparate behaviors. For example, intentional IS record modifications within 
one‟s authorized workspace require less computer skills, while record changes requiring an 
escalated user privilege demand more computer knowledge to penetrate the internal firewall 
and to remove the digital footprint of such actions from log records. Consequently, control 
remedies such as instituting supervisory authorisation prior to record changes does not fully 
address the act of unauthorised record changes requiring high computer competency which 
demands protective control technologies to detect such attempts. The deviant behavior 
perspective therefore provides a foundation to understand negative insider behaviors at the 
aggregated level but fails to address typological differences at the subset level as behaviors 
are categorised only on a basis of intentions (i.e., malicious and non-malicious).  
 Consequently, investigating insiders‟ dysfunctional behaviors without applying an 
appropriate segregation of behavior categories could lead to sample contaminations, which 
render suggestions from the studies limited in practical use. Crossler, Johnston, Lowry, Hu, 
Warkentin, and Baskerville [6], and Posey, Roberts, Lowry, Bennett, and Courtney [36] have 
raised such methodological concerns citing that studies solely placing emphasis on improving 
security awareness among insiders cannot address the issues relating to insiders who engage 
in an act driven by malicious intentions. This is “because knowledge created from a focus on 
a single behavior or subset of behaviors does not necessarily generalize to the grand structure 
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of behaviors” [36, p.1190]. Their concerns are in line with Guo [37] and D‟arcy and Herath‟s 
[38] suggestions that the studies in security-related behaviors in IS sometimes report 
inconsistent and contradictory results. The disparate findings were caused partly by a diverse 
conceptualisation of such behaviors in which “many of the concepts overlap with each other 
on some dimensions and yet are different on others” [37, p.242] and partly because factors 
explaining IS security compliance do not necessarily account for policy violations [37]. 
Taking the above discussion into consideration, this study tries to fill in the gap in the 
literature and aims to provide an indication of how dysfunctional information system 
behaviors at their aggregated and subset levels play a crucial role in information system 
security (mis)behavior. Overall, this paper searches for differences in behavioral intentions 
and in the cause-effect relationships between these intentions and their predictor variables 
among different types of dysfunctional information system behaviors. This paper accordingly 
addresses the above methodological issues in the current studies on insider dysfunctional 
behaviors in information systems [e.g., 4, 6, 36-38], allowing an examination of behavioral 
intentions and changes in the predictors of these intentions across different types of 
dysfunctional behaviors. 
The next section of the paper reviews the conceptual discussion regarding 
dysfunctional information system behaviors, categories of insider behavior based on Stanton, 
Stam, Mastrangelo, and Jolton‟s [39] taxonomy, intention of dysfunctional behaviors, and the 
antecedents of intention. This conceptual discussion leads to the development of research 
propositions, which are subsequently described. It is followed by a presentation of research 
methodology and data employed in this study. This study uses vignettes in collecting the data 
through a survey to middle managers of medium sized enterprises (SMEs), and tests the 
model and analyzes the responses using partial least square structural equation modelling 
(PLS-SEM). Description and discussion of empirical results follow, where the study provides 
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important findings which show that both the intentions and the causal links between these 
intentions and their antecedents vary among different behavior categories. This paper 
concludes with a summary, limitations and future research opportunities that emerge from the 
study.  
   
2. Conceptual discussion and proposition development 
Some attempts to disaggregate seemingly similar behaviors have been demonstrated 
by Davis [40] who modelled two pathological internet uses/misuses with reference to their 
symptoms and effects. The work not only provides a general foundation to dysfunctional 
behavior classifications but also offers some understanding on how intricate connections of 
psychopathology (e.g., depression and social anxiety) and situational factors reinforce 
Internet users‟ cognitive approaches leading to Internet uses/misuses. Magklaras and Furnell 
[41] extended this concept by including computer skills as a part of their proposed user 
sophistication model, which advanced the identification and classification of dysfunctional 
behaviors.  
 Stanton et al. [39] proposed that the dysfunctional behaviors of interest should be 
mapped onto a two-dimensional plane, with the x-axis being the intensity of intentions (i.e., 
malicious to neutral to benevolent) and the y-axis being the level of computer skills required 
(i.e., low to high). Using this 2-vector plane, Stanton et al. [39], in their study, listed 94 
behaviors which were later categorised into 6 types of behaviors, which include 4 risky types 
of insider behaviors (i.e., intentional destruction, detrimental misuse, dangerous tinkering, 
and naïve mistake) and 2 types of behaviors that are considered as acceptable practices (i.e., 
aware assurance, and basic hygiene). Their study is one of significant studies that has paved 
a way to aggregation and disaggregation of insider behaviors. These 6 types of behaviors are 
shown in Fig.1 with their descriptions summarized in Table 1. 
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Fig. 1: Insider behavior categories [39] 
 
Table 1: Description of behavior categories [39] 
Behaviors Descriptions 
 
Intentional 
destruction 
 
Requires high technical expertise together with a strong intention to harm 
organizational IS assets. 
 
Detrimental misuse 
 
Requires minimal technical expertise with a minimal intention to do harm 
through actions such as annoyance, harassment, and rule breaking. 
 
Dangerous tinkering Requires technical expertise but with no clear intention to do harm to 
organizational IS assets. 
Naïve mistake Requires minimal technical expertise with no clear intention to harm 
organizational IS assets. 
 
Aware assurance Behavior requires technical expertise together with a strong intention to do 
good by preserving and protecting organizational IS assets. 
Basic hygiene Requires no technical expertise but includes a clear intention to preserve and 
protect organizational IS assets. 
 
Recently, Guo [37] suggested eight indicators to identify the subsets of dysfunctional 
behaviors: (1) intentions (focuses on volitional/non-volitional action), (2) malicious/non-
malicious, (3) level of computer skills and knowledge, (4) types of perpetrator, (5) job 
Malicious  Benevolent 
Intention  Low  
High  
Computer skills  
Intentional 
destruction 
Detrimental 
misuse 
Dangerous 
tinkering 
Naïve 
mistake 
Aware 
assurance 
Basic 
hygiene 
Neutral  
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relatedness, (6) direct or indirect damage to organizations, (7) requiring action or absence of 
actions by employees, and (8) actions are subject to policies. 
To clearly layout the use of the insider dysfunctional behavior perspective in existing 
studies, relevant literature was analyzed to see how thematic behaviors were studied, how 
different types of behaviors were pooled together and/or separately examined, and where 
these behaviors reside within Stanton et al.‟s  [39] taxonomy (see Appendix A). The 
information in Appendix A highlights the general concerns raised by Crossler et al. [6], Posey 
et al. [36], Guo [37], Warkentin and Willison [4], and D‟arcy and Herath [38] on the 
methodological issues in the existing studies on insider dysfunctional behaviors, particularly 
where samples are aggregated or disaggregated with limited or no attempt to differentiate 
their fundamental differences.  
 
2.1. Using intention to capture dysfunctional behaviors 
Intention has been recognized as a good predictor of actual behavior [42-44], driving 
a person to behave the way he/she does. The essence of the intention-behavior relationship is 
that the stronger the intention a person has, the more likely it is that the person will engage in 
the behavior [45, 46]. Intention is “assumed to capture the motivational factors that influence 
a behavior” [42, p.181]. It is an indication of “how hard people are willing to try, of how 
much effort they are planning to exert, in order to perform the behavior” [42, p.181]. 
Accordingly, intention is central to behavior, and it has been used widely as a proxy for 
actual behavior in situations when the behavior in question is difficult to be reliably or 
practically measured [e.g., in 44, 47, 48-50]. This is particularly the case when the behavior 
of interest is one that entails negative consequences such as disciplinary actions resulting 
from abusing organizational IS assets. Therefore, using intention to approximate actual 
behavior allows researchers to model their study to address actual (mis)behavior.  
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Utilising Stanton et al.‟s [39] taxonomy (as shown in Fig. 1), this study uses a four-
quadrant dysfunctional behavior taxonomy to serve as a basis for instrument development 
and analyses in this study. These four categories of dysfunctional behaviors are (1) 
intentional destruction, which requires a high level of computer skills and is accompanied 
with a malicious intention; (2) detrimental misuse, which includes a malicious intention but 
only requires a low level of computer skills; (3) dangerous tinkering, which requires a high 
level of computer skills but has a neutral intention; and (4) naïve mistake, which has a neutral 
intention and requires only a low level of computer skills. The other two categories of 
behaviors in Stanton et al.‟s [39] taxonomy (i.e., aware assurance and basic hygiene) are not 
included in this study because these are considered benevolent or good practices. 
 
2.2. Antecedents influencing dysfunctional behavioral intention  
 The theory of planned behavior (TPB) was used in this study in order to analyze 
dysfunctional behavioral intention at its grand structure and subset levels. TPB has been used 
to predict intention in many areas related to dysfunctional behaviors such as unethical use of 
IS [51], software piracy [30] and IS misuse [46]. Ajzen‟s description of TPB [42], seen in 
Fig. 2, showed intention as a construct in predicting actual behavior with attitude, subjective 
norms and perceived behavioral control as antecedents influencing intention.  
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Fig. 2: Theory of planned behavior [42] 
 
Attitude refers to an individual‟s preconceived cognition regarding a given behavior  
[42, 43, 52, 53]. The stronger the positive attitude towards a certain behavior, the higher the 
resulting intention to perform such behavior. This premise has been validated in many studies 
such as those of Hansen, Jensen and Solgaard  [54], which predicted online purchase 
intention; Jimmieson, Peach and White  [55], which ascertained employees‟ support for an 
organizational change; and Workman  [46], which determined employees‟ use, disuse and 
misuse of an organization‟s expert and decision support systems.  
Subjective norms refers to an individual‟s perception of important others‟ beliefs on 
whether she or he should engage in a given behavior  [42, 43, 52, 53]. Well-aligned 
subjective norms tend to result in a stronger intention.  It has been argued that a strong 
psychological contract creates a resilient bond between an individual and her or his reference 
group [55] resulting in a moral belief, which in turn becomes a robust predictor of intentions 
[30, 34, 56], even to the extent of contradicting one‟s attitude [57, 58].  
Perceived behavioral control (PBC), on the other hand, is a subjective evaluation on 
how much an individual anticipates a level of control she or he has over behavior [52]. PBC 
is said to have attributes that reflect more of general external factors other than those 
Behavior 
Perceived 
behavioral 
control 
Attitude 
Intention Subjective 
norms 
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measured by self-efficacy [59]. However, PBC is not merely a single vector to intentions. 
The locus of control in PBC is a relative measure of how much control an individual has over 
resources to perform the behavior, which includes self-efficacy [see 60, 61, 62] and control 
over the outcomes of the behavior which are proxied as anticipated benefits [see 63].  
The amount of control that an individual has over the relevant resources is translated 
into a stronger intention to perform a given behavior. This premise has been reflected in 
components of many other theories such as effort-expectancy in unified theory of acceptance 
and use of technology (UTAUT) [45], perceived-ease-of-use  in technology acceptance 
model (TAM) by Davis [64], and complexity in innovation diffusion theory (IDT) [65]. 
Similarly, the higher level of perceived control an individual has over anticipated favorable 
outcomes of a certain behavior for her or himself, the more likely that her or his intention to 
perform such behavior converges [66] because the outcomes are viewed as a reward for the 
risk taken in performing the behavior [58].  
Despite its efficacy, TPB has appeared to be non-resilient due to conflicting findings 
in various studies, especially in predicting insider dysfunctional behaviors with negative 
consequences. For example, in a study conducted over online purchase intention, Hansen et 
al. [54] found that, although attitude and subjective norms exhibited strong effects on 
intention, PBC had a small or non-significant effect on intention. This indicates that 
variations in intentions may be further explained by other factors beyond what the three TPB 
predictors (i.e., attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control) have accounted 
for. Tsohou, Karyda, Kokolakis, and Kiountouzis [5], Wang, Gupta and Rao [67], and 
Kraemer, Carayon and Clem [68] for example, suggested organizational and technological 
factors to be examined. 
As one type of behavior could form an alternative course of action of, or reciprocal to, 
the other type of behavior [see 69], the relationships between attitude, subjective norms, 
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perceived behavioral control and subsequent intention to perform a given behavior could also 
change. This perspective gives a strong indication that each type of (mis)behavior should be 
studied separately rather than in a single pool of categories. In order to systematically study 
different, yet related, types of behavior, a proper approach or taxonomy has to be used. 
Stanton et al.‟s [39] taxonomy, which categories four-quadrant dysfunctional behaviors, is 
suitable to be used for this purpose. Within this taxonomy, a variation in the effects of TPB 
predictor constructs (attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control) could be 
posited as a result of different intensities of intentions and different levels of computer skills 
within what are otherwise a similar set of behaviors. By implementing this dysfunctional 
behavior taxonomy, which is based on a 2-vector dimension, this study expects to find 
empirical support to strengthen suggestions from previous scholars [e.g., 4, 6, 36, 37] that 
different types of dysfunctional behaviors have to be studied separately. Therefore, this study 
develops propositions as follows. 
Proposition 1:  The intentions underlying behaviors vary among different types of 
dysfunctional information system behaviors. 
Proposition 2:  The causal links between the TPB factors (i.e., attitude, subjective norms and 
perceived behavioral control) and the intentions underlying behaviors vary 
among different types of dysfunctional information system behaviors. 
 
 Overall, this study tries to investigate different types of dysfunctional information 
system behaviors to determine if there are any differences among them in behavioral 
intentions and in the cause-effect relationships between the TPB predictor variables and these 
intentions. This study accordingly addresses the concerns on the methodological issue where 
sample contaminations may limit the usefulness of prior studies on information security [4, 6, 
36, 37]. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Vignettes and scale development 
Studies that involve values and norms have always posed difficult methodological 
questions to achieve a certain level of internal validity (Finch, 1987). The widely used 
solution to this methodological challenge is to present respondents with vignettes, which are 
short description s of hypothetical scenarios that comprise the essential information for 
respondents to base their judgments upon. In this study, four vignettes, each with a different 
theme, were adapted from the work of D'Arcy [70] to conform to the four dysfunctional 
behavioral categories in the taxonomy suggested by Stanton et al. [39] that were used in this 
study. The use of vignettes is crucial to this study to alleviate social desirability, common 
method bias and acquiescence bias [6] by putting a comfortable distance between the 
respondent and the subject described in the vignette [71-74].  
To develop vignettes uniquely responsive to specific topical applications and to 
improve their internal validity, a careful design is needed to create context-sensitive, realistic 
and familiar scenarios [73]. Although a vignette is hypothetical and commonly involves a 
„fictitious third person‟, the closer the vignette is able to relevantly and accurately depict an 
individual‟s situation, the more sensitive and effective the instrument will perform [75]. 
D‟Arcy [70] carefully chose and tested four IS misuse vignettes in their study since they are 
considered nonintrusive, and hence provided a comfortable way for the respondents to 
answer. This paper adapted and modified these vignettes, and included the following four 
vignettes in the survey: (1) unauthorized modification of computerized data – portrayed 
intentional destruction behavior; (2) unauthorized access to computerized data – portrayed 
detrimental misuse behavior; (3) unauthorized unlicensed software installation – portrayed 
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dangerous tinkering behavior; and (4) unauthorized password sharing – portrayed naïve 
mistake behavior.  
These vignettes depicted hypothetical situations that required relatively low to 
moderate levels of malicious intention and computer skills. Therefore, the relative differences 
among the four vignettes in terms of either computer skills and/or malicious intention are 
rather moderate. However, they provided more realistic and familiar scenarios that could 
relevantly and accurately portray the respondents‟ daily situation, and hence could result in 
improved internal validity [50, 76].  
The TPB variables (i.e., intention, attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioral 
control) were measured by the instruments adapted from previous studies of Azjen [42], 
Chatterjee [51], Thompson, Higgins and Howell [66], and Venkatesh, Morris, Gordon and 
Davis [45]. These variables are intention (INTENT), which was measured using 5 items, 
subjective norms (SN) which was measured using 3 items; attitude (ATT), which was 
measured using 2 items; and perceived behavioral control (PBC), which was measured using 
5 items. 
It has been posited that organizational culture is associated with employee behavior, 
binding the organization‟s members with complex beliefs, expectations, ideas and values 
[77]. In order to control for the effect of organizational culture, four dimensions of 
organizational culture, i.e., support, innovation, practice and performance, were measured 
using items adapted from Muijen, Koopman, Witte, Cock, Susanj, Lemoine, Bourantas, 
Papalexandris, Branyicski, Spaltro, Jesuino, Neves, Pitariu, Konrad, Peiró, González-Romá 
and Turnipseed [78]. These dimensions formed a higher-order factor, which was used as a 
control variable (CULTURE).  
The items measuring CULTURE and TPB components are summarized in Appendix 
B. All of these items were measured using a 7-point scale. Depending of their context, the 
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TPB items were assigned either a 7-point scale from „strongly disagree‟ to „strongly agree‟, 
or from „not at all‟ to „all the time‟, or from „very unlikely‟ to „very likely‟, For the 
CULTURE items, the respondents were asked to describe on a 7-point scale how many 
people in the organization the event was applicable to („nobody‟ to „everyone‟), or how often 
a certain event occurred („never‟ to „always‟). 
The instrument containing all four vignettes and the TPB items was pre-tested on 
eight middle managers to examine the overall structure of the instrument. Considering 
feedback received from the pre-test,  two additional items were added to the initial three 
items adapted from Chatterjee [51] and Venkatesh et al. [45] on the intention construct. These 
two items were developed to better capture the overall notion of dysfunctional behavioral 
intention. The revised questionnaire and the vignettes were subsequently pre-tested on 38 
middle managers to assess the reliability of the items in the revised instrument. Four sets of 
questionnaires were prepared, each attached with one vignette from one of the four types of 
dysfunctional behaviors in the taxonomy. Ten questionnaires for each set were sent to the 
respondents, and two of the forty respondents did not return the questionnaires. The results of 
this second pre-test showed a set of satisfactory loadings on the components and a sufficient 
reliability of the instrument for the actual study with Cronbach‟s alpha ranging from 0.77 to 
0.98.  
The variables used in this study and their items are described in Appendix B. The 
vignettes, themes and relevant dysfunctional behavior types are summarized in Appendix C. 
 
3.2. Sample and data collection 
The sample used in this study was middle managers of medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs) in Malaysia. The list of companies was obtained from SME Corp of Malaysia, which 
is a central agency for SMEs, commissioned by the Malaysian government to formulate 
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policies and coordinate programs among other agencies relevant to the SMEs. Medium size 
companies were chosen for this study since companies this size have normally developed a 
unique organizational culture, but not one so large that the culture becomes disparate from 
one department to another [79]. This study also focused on companies in three sectors (i.e., 
service, retailing and manufacturing) which were chosen for their volume of transactions and 
extensive use of IS. Finally, the middle manager group was chosen since staff within this 
group were commonly provided with an IS user privilege or system access which presented 
an opportunity to (mis)use the system. 
412 responses were collected from 1380 survey questionnaires mailed and emailed. 
Each survey questionnaire sent to the respondent was attached with only one of the four 
vignettes, which was randomly assigned. Responses with a missing data percentage of more 
than 20% were excluded [1, 80, 81]. 91 responses were received from the email-based 
survey, and 2 responses were excluded because of missing data. 321 responses were received 
through the mailed survey, and 23 responses were excluded because of missing data. The 
total 387 useable responses were represented by 23% from email (89 responses out of 380 
email invitations) and 30% from mail (298 returned from 1000 mailed invitations).  
The overall response rate was 28%, which was considered satisfactory in a survey-
based study.  Baruch and Holtom [82] conducted an extensive review comprising 1607 
journal articles and found that an average response rate for a survey within organizational 
research stood at 36% with a standard deviation of 18.8. Other studies suggested that 
response rates for mail-based email-based surveys could be as low as 21% and 10%, 
respectively [see 1, 83]. The data collection was conducted for a 5-month period beginning in 
February 2013. Descriptive statistics of the responses are shown in Tables 2 and 3 below. 
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Table 2: Sample descriptive statistics 
 
Vignette  
1 
Vignette  
 2 
Vignette  
 3 
Vignette  
 4 Total 
Male 28 31 40 42 141 
Female 44 74 58 70 246 
Total 72 105 98 112 387 
Age group: 
    20 - 30 42 72 54 70 238 
31 - 45 30 33 40 40 143 
> 45 
  
4 2 6 
 
72 105 98 112 387 
 
 
Table 3: Item descriptive statistics 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Median 
att1 3.445 1.924 3 
att2 3.585 1.890 4 
sn1 3.788 1.845 4 
sn2 3.737 1.883 4 
sn3 4.065 1.748 4 
pbc1b 4.057 1.887 4 
pbc2b 4.109 1.907 4 
pbc1a 4.376 1.822 5 
pbc2a 4.283 1.804 5 
pbc3a 4.433 1.721 5 
int1 3.506 1.878 4 
int2 3.556 1.868 4 
int3 3.44 1.959 4 
int4 3.518 1.991 4 
int5 3.497 2.019 3 
 
3.3. Data analysis 
Data was initially analyzed using t-tests to see if there were any significant 
differences in the mean values of the constructs between the two modes of survey distribution 
(i.e., mail-based and email-based). The results show that there were no significant differences 
between mail and email responses for all items (see Appendix D).   
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Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was subsequently performed to determine factorial 
validity of the items. The EFA was conducted using principal component analysis extraction 
with oblique rotation. The result from the EFA was used as a basis for the development of the 
latent constructs in subsequent analyses.  
Partial least square structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM) was later used to test 
the full research model, which included behavior types (VIGNETTE) and organizational 
culture (CULTURE) as control variables. PLS-SEM is used in this study due to the nature of 
the approach that seeks to maximise the explained variance in the dependent latent construct 
(in this case, intentions) for predictive and theory development purposes [84, 85]. Despite 
TPB being widely acknowledged for its efficacy, the main objective of this study is to look 
into different types of dysfunctional information system behaviors, and search, among them, 
for differences in intentions underlying behaviors and in the cause-effect relationships 
between the TPB predictor variables and these intentions.  
In a pursuance of this objective, PLS-SEM is preferred in this study as the method 
provides advantages over first generation statistical techniques (e.g., correlation and 
regression) and covariance-based SEM (CB-SEM) for theory building [86]. PLS-SEM 
incorporates several statistical techniques that are not part of CB-SEM, resulting in more 
reliable parameter estimates in exploratory analysis required for theory building [87-89] 
without inflating the t-statistic [86]. The advantage of PLS-SEM in theory building is further 
enhanced by the availability of modes in PLS that define specific algorithms to be used to 
output parameter estimates appropriate for specific research situations [90]. 
PLS-SEM also allows “constructs with fewer items (e.g., one or two) to be used” 
since “the constructs‟ measurement properties are less restrictive with PLS-SEM” 
comparatively to that of CB-SEM [84, p.140]. Additionally, PLS-SEM is arguably found to 
be useful in dealing with research model that incorporates higher-order constructs [86]. The 
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control variable used in this study, i.e., CULTURE, was a second-order construct, providing 
further reason for the use of PLS-SEM in this study. 
Three commonly available modes in PLS-SEM analysis are (1) Mode A which is 
equivalent to correlation weights to optimise out-of-sample prediction [90], (2)Mode B which 
is regression weights equivalence using multiple ordinary least square (OLS) regressions that 
optimise R
2
 [91], and (3) PLS regression mode which does not allow estimates of inner 
model to influence outer model parameters [92] resulting in a more stable and better 
interpretable alternative to OLS particularly in a view of multicollinearity [93]. In this study, 
the PLS regression mode was used to reduce potential collinearity effect. 
A two-step approach on PLS-SEM was used in the analysis following suggestions by 
Anderson and Gerbing [94], and Hair Jr, Sarstedt, Hopkins and Kuppelwieser [89]. This step 
requires assessments on the measurement and the structural models. The assessment criteria 
for both measurement and structural models are summarized in Tables 4 and 5. WarpPLS 
version 4.0 was used in this study.  Among many features offered, this software estimates p-
values for path coefficients automatically and also provides variance inflation factor (VIF) for 
latent constructs allowing an easy assessment for multicollinearity issue in the research 
model. 
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Table 4: Measurement model assessment criteria 
Assessments Criteria Notes References 
Item reliability Individual item standardised 
loading on parent factor. 
Min. of 0.50 Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson 
[95] 
 
 
Convergent 
validity 
 
Individual item standardised 
loading on parent factor, and 
 
Loadings with sig. p-value 
 
 
Min. of 0.50 
 
 
p < 0.05 
 
Hair et al. [95] 
 
 
Gefen and Straub [96] 
 
 Composite reliability > 0.70 Fornell and Larcker [97] 
Nunnally and Bernstein [98] 
Hair et al. [95] 
 
 Average variance extracted 
(AVE) 
> 0.50 Hair et al. [95] 
Urbach and Ahlemann [99]  
 
Discriminant 
validity 
Square-root of AVE More than the 
correlations of 
the latent 
variables. 
 
Hair et al. [95] 
 
Reliability Cronbach‟s alpha 
 
 
> 0.70 
 
 
Nunnally and Bernstein [98] 
Urbach and Ahlemann [99] 
Hair et al. [95] 
 
 Variance inflation factor (VIF) < 10 
 
< 5 
Hair et al. [95] 
 
Kock and Lynn [100] 
  
Nature of 
construct 
Formative / reflective:  Chin [87] 
Coltman, Devinney, Midgley 
and Veniak [101] 
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Table 5: Structural model criteria 
Criteria Notes References 
Coefficient of determination, R
2
 0.67 substantial 
0.33 average 
0.19 weak 
Chin [87] 
 
Predictive relevance, Q
2
 > 0 
Stone-Geisser test 
Geisser [102] 
Stone [103] 
Effect size, f 
2
 0.02 small 
0.15 medium 
0.35 large 
Cohen [104] 
Path coefficient Assessed on: 
Magnitude 
Sign 
p-value 
Hair et al. [95] 
 
 
4. Results and discussions 
4.1. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
A principal component analysis (PCA) with oblique rotation was run as an initial test 
on items correlations. 9 components were extracted based on eigenvalue more than 1. These 
included 4 components of organizational culture (CULTURE) and 5 components of the TPB. 
For CULTURE, 21 items loaded into 4 distinct components, i.e., support comprised of 6 
items, innovation of 6 items, practices of 3 items, and performance of 6 items. For TPB, 13 
items loaded into 5 distinct components, i.e., intention (INTENT) comprised of 3 items, 
subjective norms (SN) of 3 items, attitude (ATT) of 2 items, and the remaining 5 items 
measuring perceived behavioral control (PBC) loaded into two components which were 
labelled as perceived behavioral control over outcomes of behavior (PBC-Out) with 2 items, 
and perceived behavioral control over resources to engage in behavior (PBC-Res) with 3 
items. The list of items for PBC-Out and PBC-Res is provided in Appendix 3.The PCA 
results on PBC suggest that PBC is not a single construct.  It is rather a function of two first-
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order constructs – perceived control over the resources and perceived control over outcomes 
of the behavior. This corroborates indications from previous studies [45, 60-63, 65, 66].  
 
4.2. Measurement model assessment 
 The measurement model was assessed with reference to criteria in Table 4. Individual 
item reliability was confirmed with item standardised loading on parent factor achieving a 
minimum value of 0.50 (see Appendix E). As demonstrated in Appendix E convergent 
validity was also achieved with significant items loading (p-value < 0.001). Further, 
convergent validity was also confirmed with composite reliability for all latent constructs of 
more than 0.70 and average variance extracted (AVE) of more than 0.50 as shown in Table 6. 
The instrument‟s reliability was demonstrated with sufficient Cronbach‟s alpha of more than 
0.70 and variance inflation factor (VIF) of less than 5. 
 
Table 6: Latent variable coefficients 
 
ATT SN PBC-Out 
PBC-
Res INTENT CULTURE 
R
2 
    
0.732 
 Adjusted R2 
    
0.728 
 Composite reliability 0.974 0.968 0.980 0.905 0.967 0.878 
Cronbach's alpha 0.947 0.951 0.958 0.841 0.957 0.815 
AVE 0.950 0.911 0.960 0.761 0.853 0.644 
Full collinearity VIF 3.122 3.299 3.601 3.005 3.512 1.040 
Q
2 
    
0.742 
 
AVE = Average variance extracted, VIF = Variance inflation factor 
 
The measurement model also demonstrated sufficient discriminant validity with 
square-root of AVE of latent constructs exceeding their respective inter-construct correlation. 
This is shown in Table 7. It is also noted in Table 7 that PBC-Out and PBC-Res exhibited 
relatively high correlation of .81 despite higher square-root of AVE values. The constructs 
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was maintained as two distinct constructs based on VIF assessment of less than 5 and AVE of 
more than 0.50 [see 105].  
 
Table 7: Latent variable means, standard deviations, square-root of AVEs and correlations 
 
Mean SD ATT SN 
PBC-
Out 
PBC-
Res INTENT CULTURE 
ATT 3.515 1.907 0.975 
     SN 3.863 1.830 0.772 0.954 
    PBC-Out 4.083 1.896 0.642 0.681 0.980 
   PBC-Res 4.364 1.782 0.574 0.636 0.806 0.872 
  INTENT 3.501 1.901 0.770 0.772 0.711 0.643 0.924 
 CULTURE 5.193 1.355 0.148 0.105 0.094 0.071 0.064 0.802 
Square-root of AVEs are in bold on the diagonal. 
 
4.3. Structural model assessment 
 A full structural model, shown in Fig. 3, was run for a full dataset [see 11, 20, 28]. 
The structural model was assessed based on coefficient of determination (R
2
), predictive 
relevance (Q
2
), effect size (f 
2
) and magnitude and sign (β) and p-value of path coefficient as 
summarized in Table 7. 
The full structural model showed that four predictors accounted for 73% of variation 
in INTENT (R
2
= 0.73), after controlling for organizational culture (CULTURE) and effects 
of behavior types (VIGNETTE). According to Chin [87], R
2
 of this magnitude is considered 
substantial. A Stone-Geisser test also showed that the model has sufficient predictive 
relevance (Q
2
 = 0.74). These R
2
 and Q
2
 figures indicate a highly predictive model.  
The result further showed that structural paths leading from the predictors to the 
criterion (INTENT) were all significant with ATT having the largest impact on INTENT in 
both magnitude and effect size (β = 0.45, p < 0.001, f 2= 0.37). SN, on the other hand, had a 
medium effect on INTENT (β = 0.24, p < 0.001, f 2= 0.19), while two components of 
perceived behavior control, despite their statistical significances, both demonstrated relatively 
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weak effects (PBC-OutC: β = 0.10, p = 0.02, f 2= 0.07; PBC-Res: β = 0.13, p = 0.002, f 2= 
0.08).  
 
 
Fig. 3. Full structural model 
 
4.4. Intentions among different types of dysfunctional information system behaviors  
 A one-way between groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to investigate 
differences in behavioral intentions among the four dysfunctional information system 
behavior types. As the sample size for each vignette was relatively unequal, post hoc 
ANOVA analyses were set with Gabriel‟s procedure [106] to account for the differences. 
Levene‟s test also indicated homogeneity of variance could not be assumed in this analysis (F 
(3, 383) = 4.966, p = 0.002). Therefore, contrast test was read from unequal variance value 
set to preserve conservative estimate.  
 The result of the ANOVA was statistically significant, indicating that there are 
differences in behavioral intentions among the four types of dysfunctional information 
system behaviors (F (3, 383) = 10.51, p < 0.001). Post hoc tests further revealed that 
dangerous tinkering (M = 4.29, SD = 1.70) had a significantly higher impact on intention 
Intention 
(INTENT) 
Control over 
outcomes 
(PBC-OutC) 
Subjective 
norm (SN) 
Attitude 
(ATT) 
Control over 
resources 
(PBC-Res) 
Behavior types 
(VIGNETTE) 
Organizational 
culture 
(CULTURE) 
Control Variables 
β = 0.45,  
p < 0.001, 
 f 
2
= 0.37 
β = 0.13,  
p = 0.002, 
 f 
2
= 0.08 
β = 0.24,  
p < 0.001,  
f 
2
= 0.19 
β = -0.05, 
 p = 0.12, 
 f 
2
= 0.01 
R 
2
= 0.73 
β = 0.10,  
p = 0.02, 
 f 
2
= 0.07 β = 0.10, 
 p = 0.02, 
 f 
2
= 0.03 
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compared to the impacts of naïve mistake (M = 3.08, SD = 1.70), detrimental misuse (M = 
2.99, SD = 1.73) and intentional destruction (M = 3.55, SD = 1.97) on intention. However, no 
significant mean differences were found between naïve mistake, detrimental misuse and 
intentional destruction. The mean differences and their respective effect sizes are summarized 
in Table 8. These results support Proposition 1 that the intentions underlying behaviors vary 
among different types of dysfunctional information system behaviors. 
 
Table 8: Mean differences, significance levels and effect sizes  
(I) Vignettes (J) Vignettes 
Mean 
differences 
(I-J) 
Std. 
error Sig. 
Contrast 
levels 
Effect 
size, d 
Dangerous 
tinkering 
Naive mistake 1.21 0.28 0.000 1 0.44 
Intentional destruction 0.74 0.25 0.018 2 0.30 
Detrimental misuse 1.30 0.25 0.000 3 0.53 
       
Detrimental misuse Naive mistake -0.09 0.27 1.000 4 0.03 
Intentional destruction -0.56 0.24 0.123 6 0.24 
       
Naive mistake Intentional destruction -0.47 0.27 0.395 5 0.18 
 Dependent Variable: INTENT 
 
 In order to test for differences in the cause-effect relationships between the TPB 
predictor variables and behavioral intentions among the four types of dysfunctional 
information system behaviors, a separate PLS-SEM was run for each vignette with 
CULTURE as a control variable. The results of the PLS-SEM analysis, together with R
2
 and 
adjusted R
2
 values for each behavior type are summarized in Table 9.  
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Table 9: Path coefficients, R
2
 and adjusted R
2
 
 
R
2 
adjusted 
R
2 ATT SN 
PBC-
Out 
PBC-
Res 
Vignette 1:  
Naïve mistake 0.734 0.714 0.170* 0.287* 0.365** 0.005 
       
Vignette 2:  
Detrimental misuse 0.780 0.769 0.544** 0.225* 0.105 0.071 
       
Vignette 3:  
Dangerous tinkering 0.831 0.822 0.616** 0.035 0.011 0.323** 
       
Vignette 4:  
Intentional destruction 
0.853 0.846 0.626** 0.302** 0.031 0.050 
Dependent variable: INTENT. * Significant at p < 0.05, **Significant at p < 0.001 
INTENT = Intention, ATT = Attitude, SN = Subjective norms, PBC-OutC = Perceived 
behavioral control over outcomes, PBC-Res = Perceived behavioral control over resources 
 
It can be seen from the results that the significant effects of each predictor variable on 
intention vary for each vignette. Across all four vignettes, only the causal link between 
attitude and intention remained significant. Subjective norms did not have a significant effect 
on intention in the dangerous tinkering type of behavior, but it significantly affected intention 
in the other three types of behaviors. The cause-effect relationships between perceived 
behavioral control over outcomes and perceived behavioral control over resources on 
intention changed in varying degrees for each type of dysfunctional behavior. Perceived 
behavioral control over resources only had a significant effect on intention in the dangerous 
tinkering type of behavior, while perceived behavioral control over outcomes was observed 
to only affect intention in the naïve mistake type of behavior.  
These PLS results show that the cause-effect relationships between the predictor 
variables and behavioral intentions among the four types of dysfunctional information system 
behaviors are different. The changes in magnitude and significance of the paths leading from 
predictor variables to intention for each behavior category therefore support Proposition 2, 
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which states that the causal links between the TPB factors (i.e., attitude, subjective norms and 
perceived behavioral control) and the intentions underlying behaviors vary among different 
types of dysfunctional information system behaviors.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 The results of this study suggest that both the intentions underlying behaviors and the 
causal links between the TPB factors and these intentions vary among the four types of 
dysfunctional information system behaviors. These provide empirical support for the 
methodological concerns and fill the gap in the literature on insider dysfunctional behaviors, 
where samples are aggregated or disaggregated without sufficient attempt to differentiate 
their fundamental differences [see  4, 6, 36, 37]. The results also show that the level of 
intention in the dangerous tinkering type of behavior is significantly higher compared to the 
levels of intention in the other three types of dysfunctional behaviors (i.e., intentional 
destruction, detrimental misuse and naïve mistake). The dangerous tinkering vignette that 
was used in this study illustrates an unauthorised installation of application into an 
organization‟s computer, which requires high computer skill and assumes high consciousness 
in order to perform the unwarranted action.  This could indicate that perpetrators who have a 
high level of computer skills may tend to engage in this type of dysfunctional behavior since 
they feel that their intentions are not malicious. From the organizational viewpoint, this kind 
of behavior certainly can pose substantial threats to the integrity of an entity‟s information 
system (IS). 
 Looking at the three TPB antecedents (i.e., attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived 
behavioral control) that were analyzed in this study, it is found that regardless of the level of 
computer skills (i.e., low or high) and intentions (i.e., malicious or neutral) the attitude 
construct remains significant across all of the four types of dysfunctional behavior used in 
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this study. Ajzen and Fishbein [42] and Armitage and Conner [59] concur that attitude is a 
result of attitudinal belief which can reside within an individual and be moulded by many 
factors. This finding should bring the focus of organizations towards effectively shaping their 
employees‟ attitudes and preventing inappropriate behaviors against IS security policy. As 
such, security awareness programs [107-109] form one of the many approaches available for 
organizations to influence their employees‟ attitudinal belief, which in essence influences 
attitude. 
The subjective norms construct is significant within three dysfunctional behaviors in 
the four-quadrant dysfunctional behavior categories: intentional destruction (a malicious 
intention requiring high computer skills), detrimental misuse (a malicious intention requiring 
low computer skills) and naïve mistake (no clear intention requiring low computer skills). 
The dangerous tinkering type of behavior does not exhibit any significant reliance on 
subjective norms. These findings show that subjective norms become an important factor 
when a perpetrator‟s intention is clearly malicious (i.e., intentional destruction and 
detrimental misuse) or intentionally ignoring. From an organizational point of view, when an 
employee is confronted with a dilemma either to engage in dysfunctional behavior or to 
refuse it altogether, a work environment, which forms a basis of reference to important 
others, plays an important role [see 110, 111, 112]. If the employee feels important others 
would take similar (unwarranted) action, it is very likely that he or she will engage in IS 
security malpractices.  
When the intention is unclear, it is the individual‟s perceived behavioral control 
(PBC) that matters. Many studies [e.g., 21, 44, 113] have treated PBC as a single construct, 
and accordingly much valuable information has been lost in the analysis. This study finds that 
PBC is a function of control over resources required to perform a given behavior and control 
over the outcomes resulting from the performance of a given behavior. Analysing the path 
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leading from these two components of PBC to behavioral intentions could create more output 
which allows an organization to better address insider dysfunctional behavior when working 
with IS.  
 On the contribution to the understanding of TPB, where it apparently fails to predict 
behavior, carefully examining the situational conditions in which the behavior of interest is 
located may be able to augment the research in question. When two or more behavior types 
are studied together, each of them has to be screened for its inter-changeability and 
reciprocity with the others. The results of this study support the concerns of Crossler et al. 
[6], Posey et al. [36], Warkentin and Willison [4], and D‟arcy and Herath [38] which 
suggested contaminations of the samples in the existing studies of insiders‟ dysfunctional 
behaviors in the information security discipline. Therefore, future studies in this field are 
encouraged to take into consideration the fine lines that separate seemingly similar, yet 
fundamentally different, types of behaviors in order to have suggestions and 
recommendations drawn from these studies for practical use.   
This study uses the vignettes adapted from D‟Arcy et al.‟s [70] work since they have 
been carefully designed and adapted from previous literature to form a non-intrusive way of 
data collection. These vignettes illustrate situations that require relatively low to moderate 
levels of malicious intention and computer skills. They offer reasonably realistic and familiar 
settings that could result in improved internal validity. However, future work using vignettes 
that illustrate a higher intensity of maliciousness and require more sophisticated computer 
skills is encouraged.  
Additionally, this paper links the vignettes with predictor variables derived from the 
TPB that have been used to predict intention in many areas related to dysfunctional 
behaviors. This approach provides an overall reasonable connection between the vignettes 
and the variables. The usage of scales for the construct items also allows the respondents to 
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give a lower score to items that may feel disconnected to a certain vignette. Nonetheless, 
future work using other vignettes and/or variables that are more strongly connected is also 
encouraged. 
As a final point, the respondents in this study are middle managers of medium sized 
enterprises in Malaysia, and therefore the generalizability of the findings should be treated 
cautiously as a limitation. Future work with different groups of respondents is strongly 
recommended. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Studies on insider dysfunctional behaviors 
Behavior themes No. of 
vignettes 
Behaviors / behavioral intentions 
studied 
Stanton et al.’s [39] 
classifications 
Security 
compliance [10]  
0 Keeping up-to-date with latest security 
threats 
Basic hygiene 
 
Security non-
compliance [11] 
4 Workstation logout Basic hygiene 
Sharing password Naïve mistake 
Reading confidential files Naïve mistake 
Copying organization‟s sensitive data Detrimental misuse 
Security 
compliance [12] 
0 
 
 
Locking screen 
 
Basic hygiene 
 
Participating in security training Aware assurance 
 
Alerting virus infection 
 
Aware assurance 
 
Scanning email attachment 
 
Aware assurance 
 
Using password autofill features 
 
Naïve mistake 
 
Sharing computer access 
 
Naïve mistake 
 
Downloading items from internet 
 
Naïve mistake 
Security 
compliance [17] 
0 Adoption of anti-malware Basic hygiene 
Security 
compliance [18] 
0 Information security conscious care Basic hygiene 
Security 
compliance [21] 
0 
 
Intention to comply with information 
system security policy 
Basic hygiene 
 
Security 
compliance [23] 
 
0 Regular scan for viruses Basic hygiene 
 
Compliance with security policy with 
regards to email 
Basic hygiene 
Compliance with security policy with 
regards to use of internet and network 
Basic hygiene 
 
Installations of operating system 
patches to prevent unauthorised access 
Aware assurance 
Security 
compliance [24] 
0 Intention to adopt security software  Basic hygiene 
Security non-
compliance [15] 
1 Password sharing Naïve mistake 
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Security non-
compliance [16] 
3 Unauthorised access (payroll data) Detrimental misuse 
Unauthorised access and transfer of 
data 
Detrimental misuse 
Stealing and selling confidential data to 
competitor 
Detrimental misuse 
Security non-
compliance [20] 
6 Reading confidential documents 
 
Naïve mistake 
Failing to report computer virus 
 
Naïve mistake 
Allowing children to play with a 
company laptop 
 
Naïve mistake 
Using unencrypted portable media 
 
Naïve mistake 
Failure to lock (log off) PC 
 
Naïve mistake 
Sharing passwords Naïve mistake 
Information system 
misuse [25] 
2 Unauthorised access Detrimental misuse 
Unauthorised data modification Intentional destruction 
Information system 
misuse [26] 
0 Cyber bullying Detrimental misuse 
Information system 
misuse [27] 
0 Cyber loafing Naïve mistake 
Information system 
misuse [28] 
4 Unauthorised software installation Dangerous tinkering 
Email misuse Detrimental misuse 
Unauthorised access via found 
password 
Detrimental misuse 
Unauthorised record change Intentional destruction 
Information system 
misuse [29] 
0 Using the internet for non-work related 
activities 
Naïve mistake 
Information system 
misuse [35] 
0 
 
 
41 behaviors ranging from non-work 
related web browsing to sabotage 
Cover the following 
classifications: 
Dangerous tinkering 
Detrimental misuse 
Intentional destruction 
Computer abuse 
[32] 
0 
 
 
10 behaviors ranging from simple non-
compliance to physically damaging 
action 
Cover the following 
classifications: 
Naïve mistake 
Dangerous tinkering 
Detrimental misuse 
Intentional destruction 
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Appendix B: Latent constructs‟ items 
Latent constructs Items 
 
Intention [45, 51] 
 
int1: I intend to carry out a similar action in future. 
int2: I predict I would carry out a similar action in future. 
int3: I plan to carry out a similar action in future. 
int4: If you are in X‟s situation, how likely is it that you would perform 
a similar action? 
int5: All things considered, would you take the same action as X did? 
 
Attitude [45, 51] att1: Carrying out such action is good. 
att2: Carrying out such action is valuable. 
 
Subjective norms [42, 45, 
51] 
sn1: People who influence my behavior think that I should carry out 
such action. 
sn2: People who are important to me think that I should carry out such 
action. 
sn3: My fellow colleagues would themselves have carried out this 
action if they had been in my place. 
 
Perceived behavioral 
control over outcomes 
(PBC-Out) [45, 66] 
Pbc2: Carrying out such action can significantly increase 
the quality of output of my job. 
Pbc3: Carrying out such action can significantly increase 
the quantity of output of my job. 
Perceived behavioral 
control over resources 
(PBC-Res) [42, 45] 
Pbc1: Carrying out such action can decrease the time needed for 
my important job responsibilities. 
Pbc4: I have the resources necessary to carry out such action. 
Pbc5: I have control over carrying out such action. 
  
Organizational culture: 
Support dimension [78] 
In regard to the support in your organization, how many people... 
Spp1: with personal problems are helped? 
Spp2: who wish to advance in promotion are supported by their 
superiors? 
 
In regard to the support in your organization, how often... 
Spp3: is constructive criticism accepted?  
Spp4: do managers express concern about employees‟ personal 
problems? 
Spp5: are new ideas about work organization encouraged? 
Spp6: do management practices allow freedom in work? 
 
Organizational culture: 
Innovation dimension 
[78] 
In regard to the innovation in your organization, how often... 
inv1: does your organization search for new markets for existing 
products?  
inv2: is there a lot of investment in new products?  
inv3: do unpredictable elements in the market environment present 
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good opportunities?  
inv4: does the organization search for new opportunities in the 
external environment?  
inv5: does the company make the best use of the employee skills to 
develop better products /services?  
inv6: does the organization search for new products/services? 
 
Organizational culture: 
Practice dimension [78] 
In regard to the practices in your organization, how often... 
prc1: are instructions written down?  
prc2: are jobs performed according to defined procedures?  
prc3: does management follow the rules themselves? 
 
Organizational culture: 
Performance dimension 
[78] 
In regard to the goal / performance of employees in your 
organization, how often... 
pfm1: is competitiveness in relation to other organizations measured?  
pfm2: is individual appraisal directly related to the attainment of 
goals?  
pfm3: does management specify the targets to be attained?  
pfm4: is it clear how performance will be evaluated?  
pfm5: are there hard criteria against which job performance is 
measured?  
pfm6: is reward dependent on performance? 
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Appendix C: Vignettes 
Vignette 1 
Theme: Unauthorized modification 
Behavior type: Intentional destruction 
Hashim prepares payroll records for the company‟s employees and therefore has a good 
access to the timekeeping and payroll system. He periodically changes the amount of hours-
worked record of other fellow friends of him by rounding up their total overtime hours such 
as 39.5 hours to 40 hours 
 
Vignette 2 
Theme: Unauthorized access 
Behavior type: Detrimental misuse 
By chance, Catherine discovered a password that allowed her to access a restricted area of the 
payroll system of the company. This allowed her to see the salary paid to other employees. At 
the same time, she was preparing to ask for a raise. Prior to meeting with the management, 
she accessed and viewed the salaries of others in similar a position to hers. She used this 
information to determine how much increment to ask for. 
 
 
Vignette 3 
Theme: Unauthorized software installation 
Behavior type: Dangerous tinkering 
Lee is given a laptop by the company that he can use while in the office as well as on the 
move. However, the laptop does not have software that allows him to tap into the production 
planning system that he is authorised to access through other computer terminals. He believes 
that software will make his work more efficient and effective. A request to the IT department 
to purchase the software is denied because it is too expensive. To solve the problem, Lee 
obtains an unlicensed copy of the software and personally installed into the laptop. 
 
Vignette 4 
Theme: Unauthorized password sharing 
Behavior type: Naïve mistake 
Linda works in the marketing department and therefore has access to the company‟s customer 
account database. One day at the office, Linda‟s co-worker in the same department asked to 
borrow her password in order to access the customer database because she forgot her 
password. The system administrator who was in charge in resetting the password was on sick 
leave. Linda gave her password to the co-worker for her to access the customer account 
database. 
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Appendix D: t-test for equality of means between mail-based and email-based surveys 
Item T df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
      spp1 -0.135 385 0.893 -0.021 0.157 
spp2 -1.211 385 0.227 -0.188 0.155 
spp3 0.674 385 0.501 0.106 0.157 
spp4 0.210 385 0.834 0.034 0.163 
spp5 -0.969 385 0.333 -0.141 0.145 
spp6 -0.189 385 0.850 -0.032 0.171 
inv1 -2.316 385 0.121 -0.381 0.164 
inv2 -2.025 385 0.144 -0.319 0.157 
inv3 -1.616 385 0.107 -0.229 0.142 
inv4 -2.571 385 0.111 -0.385 0.150 
inv5 -0.053 385 0.957 -0.009 0.166 
inv6 -3.214 385 0.101 -0.570 0.177 
prc1 -0.073 385 0.942 -0.011 0.150 
prc2 1.618 385 0.106 0.219 0.135 
prc3 1.046 385 0.296 0.157 0.150 
pfm1 0.635 385 0.526 0.094 0.147 
pfm2 0.609 385 0.543 0.086 0.141 
pfm3 -0.563 385 0.574 -0.078 0.138 
pfm4 1.500 385 0.135 0.241 0.161 
pfm5 0.145 385 0.884 0.022 0.149 
pfm6 0.590 385 0.556 0.104 0.175 
cpx1 -1.262 385 0.208 -0.140 0.111 
cpx2 -1.428 385 0.154 -0.200 0.140 
cpx3i -3.218 385 0.101 -0.641 0.199 
cpx4i -4.209 385 0.100 -0.826 0.196 
int1 0.708 385 0.479 0.161 0.227 
int2 0.096 385 0.924 0.022 0.226 
int3 1.681 385 0.094 0.397 0.236 
int4 -0.479 385 0.632 -0.115 0.241 
int5 -0.462 385 0.644 -0.113 0.244 
att1 1.724 385 0.086 0.400 0.232 
att2 0.691 385 0.490 0.158 0.228 
sn1 2.115 385 0.135 0.469 0.222 
sn2 2.167 385 0.131 0.490 0.226 
sn3 1.576 385 0.116 0.332 0.211 
pbc1 1.624 385 0.105 0.357 0.220 
pbc2 0.146 385 0.884 0.032 0.218 
pbc3 0.982 385 0.327 0.204 0.208 
pbc4 1.542 385 0.124 0.351 0.228 
pbc5 1.186 385 0.236 0.273 0.230 
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Appendix E: Item loadings and crossloadings 
 
Latent constructs 
  Items ATT SN PBC-Out PBC-Res INTENT CULTURE SE p- value 
att1 0.975 0.020 0.004 -0.038 -0.023 -0.024 0.044 < 0.001 
att2 0.975 -0.020 -0.004 0.038 0.023 0.024 0.044 < 0.001 
sn1 0.027 0.967 -0.070 0.056 0.016 0.002 0.044 < 0.001 
sn2 0.080 0.972 0.009 -0.060 -0.107 -0.001 0.044 < 0.001 
sn3 -0.112 0.922 0.064 0.005 0.096 -0.001 0.044 < 0.001 
pbc1b 0.052 -0.002 0.980 -0.002 -0.028 -0.011 0.044 < 0.001 
pbc2b -0.052 0.002 0.980 0.002 0.028 0.011 0.044 < 0.001 
pbc1a -0.034 -0.154 0.114 0.800 0.110 0.073 0.044 < 0.001 
pbc2a 0.067 0.040 -0.185 0.917 -0.042 -0.042 0.044 < 0.001 
pbc3a -0.038 0.097 -0.449 0.895 -0.055 -0.022 0.044 < 0.001 
int1 0.206 -0.024 -0.036 0.053 0.947 0.006 0.044 < 0.001 
int2 0.170 .018 0.009 0.007 0.953 -0.038 0.044 < 0.001 
int3 0.114 0.151 0.104 -0.102 0.928 -0.045 0.044 < 0.001 
int4 -0.347 -0.044 -0.067 0.004 0.888 0.042 0.044 < 0.001 
int5 -0.171 -0.105 -0.013 0.039 0.901 0.039 0.044 < 0.001 
Support -0.016 0.247 -0.231 0.064 0.000 0.766 0.044 < 0.001 
Innovation 0.015 -0.051 0.031 0.103 0.030 0.787 0.044 < 0.001 
Practice 0.188 -0.237 0.265 -0.304 -0.114 0.796 0.044 < 0.001 
Performance -0.174 0.047 -0.068 0.130 0.078 0.857 0.044 < 0.001 
SE = Standard error 
 
